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I. FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES OF SECTION 403

1. Section 403 evolved from legislation limiting profit to a statutory

percentage.—The first law since World War I relative to a control of
profits on armament was the Vinson-Trammell Act, enacted in 1934.
Under this law profits on naval construction contracts for vessels and
aircraft were limited to 10 percent of the contract price. In June of
1936 the act was amended to permit the offsetting of losses on one
contract against profits on another by extending the 10 percent profit
limitation to aggregate contract prices for all contracts completed
during each taxable year. In addition, the amendment permitted the
offsetting of net losses of one taxable year against net profits of the
succeeding taxable year. In the same year (1936) the Merchant
Marine Act provided for a 10 percent limitation on profits on con
tracts for ships built for the Maritime Commission. In April of 1939
the Vinson-Trammell Act was amended to provide that the 10 per
cent limitation on profits be applied only to contracts for naval vessels
and that on contracts for Army and Navy aircraft a maximum profit
of 12 percent of contract price be allowed. All of these enactments
related to peacetime procurement, since the country was not yet pre
paring for war.
In the next year, on June 28, 1940 an act was passed changing the
allowable profits on naval vessels and Army and Navy aircraft to 8
percent of the contract price. This act, coming as it did after the fall
of the Low Countries and France, is really the beginning of war profit
legislation in the United States. This act extended to subcontractors
the provisions of the Vinson-Trammell Act and reduced the profit
limitations imposed thereby to 8 percent of contract prices or 8.7
percent of allowable costs of contracts other than prime contracts
made on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. The Second Revenue Act of 1940,
approved October 8, 1940, suspended as of December 31, 1939, the
profit limitation statutes applicable to military and naval contracts
and subcontracts whenever the contractors and subcontractors were
subject to excess profits tax. Pursuant to the Second War Powers
Act, approved March 27, 1941, the President by Executive Order
9217, issued April 10, 1942, designated the War Production Board,
the War Department, the Navy Department, the Treasury Depart
ment, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Maritime
Commission as the governmental agencies authorized to inspect the
plants and audit the books and records of any contractor or subcon
tractor with whom a defense contract had been placed, to prevent the
accumulation of unreasonable profits.
Under this authority the War Department, the Navy Department
and the Maritime Commission, on April 25, 1942, directed the estab
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lishment of cost analysis sections and price adjustment boards. The
cost analysis sections were to conduct surveys of costs and profits in
cident to war contracts, and to act as fact finding agencies for the
price adjustment boards. The boards were to assist the Departments
and the Commission in securing voluntary adjustments or refunds
whenever costs or profits were deemed excessive.
On March 28, 1942, however, the day after the Second War Powers
Act became law, and nearly 2 weeks before Executive Order 9127 was
issued, the House of Representatives adopted the Case Amendment
to H. R. 6868 (Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation
Act, 1942), the purpose of which was to limit the profits on any war
contract to 6 percent, thereby precipitating the whole question of
additional controls over war profits.
2. Section 403 was adopted as an alternative to fixed profit legislation.
—The War and Navy Departments are opposed to uniform flat per
centage profit legislation on the theory that this virtually places con
tracts on a cost-plus basis and because it is felt that the rate of profit
should be related to the contribution and performance of the con
tractor and not to a fixed statutory percentage. A flat profit control
limitation, in the opinion of these Departments, does not achieve its
primary objective of uniformity of treatment. Although it allows a
fixed uniform percent of profit on gross sales, this is most unfair as
applied to the different types of business engaged in war work. It
does not recognize the fact that in different lines of business the same
volume of sales may require widely different amounts of capital, skill,
and work, depending on the rate of turn-over or production, the
nature of the article or services, and similar factors. Moreover, some
contractors will be using Government facilities, some will be Govern
ment financed either through advance payments, direct loans, or costplus-fixed-fee contracts, while others will be using their own facilities
and capital.
Many vital war items have required for their production the appli
cation over a period of years of highly developed inventive genius,
original designing and mechanical skill. Also, many products require
such precision in manufacture that few contractors can qualify for
their production. Furthermore, it not infrequently happens that the
contractor who develops such an article is producing it in his own
plant with his own capital and with his own painstakingly developed
machinery. Another contractor may be engaged as a new and sepa
rate source of supply, and may receive new plant, machinery and
equipment, without cost, from the Government; the “know how” and
patent licenses may have been obtained without cost from the origi
nal contractor. As a result of these contributions and modern equip
ment, the second contractor frequently produces the article at a lower
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cost than the original contractor. It is obvious that the second con
tractor is not entitled to the same rate of profit as the original one.
On the other hand, in some cases the costs of a new producer have
been twice that of the original contractor because of a lack of skill
and “know how.” Under fixed statutory limitations the new con
tractor might receive twice the profit of the original producer. This
is obviously most unfair. Consideration must also be given to the
situation where a “run of the mill product,” requiring little skill, is
being manufactured and where material costs are relatively large;
and also to cases where subassembling is performed by a subcon
tractor.
It is apparent, from these examples, that a uniform maximum rate
of profit for everyone would necessarily be unfair to many. Further
more, industry studies have revealed diversities in production so
varied that, with rare exceptions, even application of a uniform rate
to broad classifications by industries would not be practical or equi
table. Renegotiation appears to be the only method so far suggested
which is sufficiently flexible to cope with the diversity between indus
tries or the variations within them.
The War and Navy Departments, therefore, suggested the elimina
tion of the Case amendment and, at the request of the Chairman of
the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, representatives of the
War and Navy Departments and Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Chairman
of the War Production Board, agreed to suggest a substitute method
of preventing excessive or unanticipated profits on war contracts.
The substitute method recommended by the War and Navy Depart
ments and Mr. Nelson was not adopted by Congress, but the Case
Amendment was eliminated and section 403 was enacted in its place.
Section 403 was based upon the theory that the contract prices of
each contractor might be adjusted after consideration of experience
in the performance thereof and after negotiation with the contractor.
Section 403 was amended by section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942,
approved October 21, 1942, to meet certain administrative problems
encountered in its application, but its basic principles were not
changed. It is true that the very flexibility of renegotiation makes
complete uniformity and certainty almost impossible and the neces
sity of dealing with cases individually creates a serious administrative
burden. Nevertheless, it is felt that the benefits and advantages of
renegotiation outweigh these disadvantages and make it preferable
to other methods proposed.
3. Section 403 is not a tax act designed to raise revenue, but is a price
adjustment act designed to lower costs.—Section 403 has been occasion
ally but inaccurately interpreted as a tax act. The problem of exces
sive war costs and profits is primarily a problem of pricing and not of
7

taxation. Heavy taxation does not meet the problem but tends to
aggravate it by creating an incentive for increasing costs.
Three important respects in which taxation is ineffective in meet
ing the problems solved by renegotiation are:
First—War materiel contracts, which have been generally profit
able, sometimes are excessively so because many war industries have
had to be created under forced draft. In many cases profits have been
unpredictable because the production of repetitive items has in
creased by geometric proportions. Therefore, the accumulation of
excessive profits by some war contractors has been and always will be
unavoidable. These excessive profits are extremely irregular. They
accrue to some contractors, not to others. Taxation, which must
apply equally to all war and civilian businesses, cannot keep pace with
this erratic development of excessive war profits.
Second—War industries lack the normal competitive incentive for
low-cost, efficient operation. The Government, in many instances
must buy from every available source of supply, regardless of cost.
Neither taxation nor any proposed profit limitation formula restores
this incentive. In fact, taxation and most limitation formulas put a
premium on high costs.
Third—The munitions industry is extremely varied. A large part
of it operates with Government capital or Government guarantees,
substantially reducing private risks. Some contractors can continue
their peacetime processes with little change. Others must attempt
unfamiliar and unexplored operations. Some operations permit a
very rapid turn-over of the contractor’s investment, others a very
slow turn-over. No formula for limiting profits can deal equitably
with all these circumstances.
Renegotiation of contracts can do what taxation and flat formulas
cannot. It can fit the profit to the facts. It can reduce excessive
profits, leaving reasonable profits untouched. It can reward low-cost
efficiency. It can distinguish between degrees of risk and venture. It
is the only device flexible enough to fit the variety of war industries.
As section 403 is designed to meet this pricing problem, the exacti
tude and uniformity of application found under a tax act cannot be
expected. An equal degree of uniformity might be expected in the
renegotiation of groups of contracts after “the facts are in” as would
have been reached at the time of initial negotiations had all the facts
then been known. The degree of uniformity under the original nego
tiations would be varied, however, by the extent to which various fac
tors might be given different weighting by different persons or groups.
Consequently, the results of renegotiation will not and can not reach
the mathematical uniformity resulting from a tax statute that is con
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cerned only with the determination of the amount of net income
based upon a stated formula.
4. Specified purposes of and remedies under section 403—Subsection
(b) of section 403 requires the insertion in contracts for an amount
in excess of $100,000 made after April 28, 1942, of a provision requir
ing renegotiation of the contract price at a period or periods when,
in the judgment of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy,
the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Chairman of the Maritime Com
mission, the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty, as
well as a provision requiring the contractor to insert a similar pro
vision in each subcontract for an amount in excess of $100,000 made
by him under such contract.
Subsection (c) of section 403 authorizes and directs the Secretary
of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and
the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, whenever in his opinion
excessive profits have been realized, or are likely to be realized, from
any contract with his Department or the Commission, as the case may
be, or from any subcontract thereunder, whether or not made by the
contractor, to require the contractor or subcontractor to renegotiate
the contract price of any existing contract or subcontract, even though
made prior to April 28, 1942 (provided final payment had not been
made prior to that date), and of any contract or subcontract made
thereafter, whether or not it contains a renegotiation or recapture
clause, unless such contract or subcontract provides otherwise or is
exempted pursuant to other provisions of the statute.
The statute defines renegotiation as including a refixing of the con
tract price by the Secretary or the Chairman. This refixing is gener
ally accomplished by mutual agreement arrived at by negotiation be
tween the contractor and the price adjustment board of one of the
Departments or the Commission. Under these agreements, excessive
profits are eliminated in various ways, among which are the follow
ing: (1) A direct cash refund by the prime contractor to the Govern
ment, in which event his contract prices would not be adjusted for
the period covered; (2) a reduction in the contract prices on future
deliveries under prime contracts, which automatically would accrue
to the benefit of the Government; (3) a direct cash refund by the
subcontractor to the Government; and (4) a reduction in the contract
price on future deliveries under subcontracts, with a provision that
any prime contractor receiving the benefit thereof must pass on an
equivalent benefit to the Government in the form of a corresponding
reduction in the contract prices of its prime contracts or a direct cash
refund to the Government. These methods may also be used in com
bination and are not exclusive of other appropriate and effective
methods applicable to particular situations.
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In the event it becomes impossible to reach a mutual agreement,
the case is then referred to the official of the Department or the Com
mission to whom authority has been delegated under the statute,
who gives consideration to the use of such special measures as he may
deem necessary or advisable.

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED AND FACTORS
CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF
EXCESSIVE PROFITS

In the present emergency the existence of excessive profits does not
necessarily indicate that a contractor has taken undue advantage of
the Government or that the contracting officers have failed to exer
cise good judgment under all the circumstances. Companies have
been asked to produce war equipment with which neither they nor
others have had any previous experience, and in quantities far be
yond anything previously contemplated. Under such circumstances
the estimates of costs have necessarily been unreliable and when sub
jected to the test of actual production have often proved to be sub
stantially higher than the actual costs. Consequently, many con
tractors have been left with profits which they neither anticipated
nor wish to retain. The true purpose of renegotiation is to determine,
preferably by agreement, the amount of these profits which exceed a
fair margin under all the circumstances, and these circumstances are
bound to vary in individual cases.
1. General principles followed in determining excessive profits.—In
considering whether costs or profits on war contracts are excessive,
the price adjustment boards are guided by the following broad
principles:
(a) That the stimulation of quantity production is of primary
importance.
(b) That reasonable profits in every case should be determined
with reference to the particular performance factors present with
out limitation or restriction by any fixed formula with respect to
rate of profit, or otherwise.
(c) That the profits of the contractor ordinarily will be deter
mined on his war business as a whole for a fiscal period, rather than
on specific contracts separately, with the possible exception of cer
tain construction contracts. Fixed price contracts are negotiated
separately from fees on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
(d) That as volume increases the margin of profit should de
crease. This is particularly true in those cases where the amount
of business done is abnormally large in relation to the amount of
the contractor’s own capital and company-owned plant, and where
10

such production is made possible only by capital and plant fur
nished by the Government.
(e) That in determining what margin of profit is fair, consider
ation should be given to the corresponding profits in pre-war base
years of the particular contractor and for the industry, especially
in cases where the war products are substantially like pre-war prod
ucts. It should not be assumed, however, that under war conditions
a contractor is entitled to as great a margin of profit as that obtained
under competitive conditions in normal times.
(f) That the reasonableness of profits should be determined be
fore provision for Federal income and excess profits taxes.
(g) That a contractor’s right to a reasonable profit and his need
for working capital should be distinguished. A contractor should
not be allowed to earn excessive profits on war contracts merely be
cause he lacks adequate working capital in relation to a greatly
increased volume of business.
2. Particular factors considered when applicable in determining exces
sive profits.—In determining the margin of profit to which a contractor
is entitled, consideration is given to the manner in which the con
tractor’s operations compare with those of other contractors with re
spect to the applicable factors; among such factors taken into con
sideration, when applicable, are the following:

(a) Price reductions and comparative prices.
(b) Efficiency in reducing costs.
(c) Economy in the use of raw materials.
(d) Efficiency in the use of facilities and in the conservation of
manpower.
(e) Character and extent of subcontracting.
(f) Quality of production.
(g) Complexity of manufacturing technique.
(h) Rate of delivery and turnover.
(i) Inventive and developmental contribution with respect to
important war products.
(/) Cooperation with the Government and with other contrac
tors in developing and supplying technical assistance to alternative
or competitive sources of supply and the effect thereof on the con
tractor’s future peacetime business.
Consideration is also given to possible increases in cost of mate
rials, imminent wage increases, and the risks assumed by a contractor
such as inexperience in new types of production, delays from inabil
ity to obtain materials, rejections, spoilage, “cut-backs” in quantities,
and guarantees of quality and performance of the product. It is also
recognized that a contractor whose pricing policy results in com
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paratively reasonable profits is entitled to more favorable treatment
than a contractor whose pricing policy results in a large amount of
unreasonable profits unless this is attributable to reduced costs rather
than over-pricing. The contractor who maintains only a reasonable
margin of profit is subjected to the risks incident to the performance
of a fixed price contract, while the contractor who practices over
pricing usually has taken few, if any, of such risks. In the latter case
the profit of the contractor should be adjusted in the direction of the
fee that might have been allowed under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract
for the production of similar articles.
The contractor in every instance is given ample opportunity to de
velop and present facts with respect to all of the above factors and to
any other factors which in his particular case may be relevant to the
contractor’s over all quality of performance, upon which his profit
reward is based.

III. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE STATUTE
The following interpretations of the statute represent the present
opinion of the Departments and the Commission and are subject to
such revision from time to time as may appear desirable as a result of
the operation of the boards under these interpretations. They are
issued for information only and are subject to change without notice.
To facilitate the issuance of changes, these interpretations are desig
nated J-PAB-1 to J-PAB-12, inclusive.
J-PAB-1

1. Contracts and subcontracts subject to renegotiation.—Under sub
section (c) of section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense
Appropriation Act, 1942 (Public, No. 528, 77th Cong.), approved
April 28, 1942, as amended by section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942
(Public, No. 753, 77th Cong.), approved October 21, 1942, whenever
in the opinion of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the
Secretary of the Treasury, or the Chairman of the Maritime Com
mission (each being hereinafter referred to as the “Secretary”), the
profits realized or likely to be realized on any contract or contracts
with such Department or Commission (each being hereinafter re
ferred to as the “Department”), or from any subcontract or subcon
tracts thereunder whether or not made by the contractor, may be ex
cessive, the Secretary is authorized and directed to require the con
tractor or subcontractor to renegotiate the prices of such contracts
and subcontracts to eliminate any excessive profits thereunder.
The provisions of section 403 relate to all contracts entered into by
the War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission. Con
12

tracts of the Treasury Department subject to renegotiation include
(1) Contracts placed under section 201 of title II of the First War
Powers Act, 1941, 55 Stat. 839 (principally lend-lease contracts,
which may be identified by the symbols “DA-TPS” preceding the
contract number);
(2) Contracts for strategic and critical materials placed under the
authority of the Act of June 7, 1939, 53 Stat. 811 (such contracts
made after March 1, 1943 may be identified by the symbols “SCMTPS” preceding the contract number);
(3) Contracts for supplies for refugee relief under the Red Cross
program, placed under the authority contained under title III of the
Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, 55
Stat. 817 (such contracts may be identified by the symbols “RR-TPS”
preceding the contract number).
Other types of contracts regularly entered into by the Procurement
Division of the Treasury Department in the ordinary course of busi
ness prior to the war period, as such, are not subject to renegotiation
unless negotiated under authority contained in title II of the First
War Powers Act, 1941. However, purchase orders, issued by the War
and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission under General
Schedule of Supplies Contracts, which are entered into by the Pro
curement Division of the Treasury Department on behalf of all de
partments and establishments of the Government, are considered as
being subject to the provisions of section 403. Purchase orders issued
by the Treasury Department itself under such contracts are also con
sidered as being subject to the provisions of section 403 if such pur
chases are for lend-lease or for the Red Cross program.
All so-called lend-lease contracts entered into by the War Depart
ment, the Navy Department, the Treasury Department and the Mari
time Commission are subject to the provisions of section 403. How
ever, lend-lease contracts entered into by any other department or
agency of the Government are not subject to renegotiation under
existing law.
Subsection (c) of section 403 is applicable to all such contracts and
subcontracts, whether or not such contracts or subcontracts contain
a renegotiation clause, unless (i) final payment pursuant to such con
tract or subcontract was made prior to April 28, 1942, or (ii) the con
tract or subcontract provides otherwise pursuant to subsection (b) or
(i), or is exempted under subsection (i), of section 403, or (iii) the
aggregate sales by the contractor or subcontractor, and by all persons
under the control of or controlling or under common control with
the contractor or subcontractor, under contracts with the Depart
ments and subcontracts thereunder do not exceed, or in the opinion
of the Secretary concerned will not exceed, $100,000 for the fiscal
13

year of such contractor or subcontractor; provided, however, no re
negotiation of the contract price pursuant to any provision therefor,
or otherwise, shall be commenced more than one year after the close
of the fiscal year of the contractor or subcontractor within which com
pletion or termination of the contract or subcontract occurs.
The term “subcontract” as used in subsection (c) is defined to
mean any purchase order or agreement to perform all or any part of
the work, or to make or furnish any article, required for the perform
ance of another contract or subcontract. The term “article” is defined
to include any material, part, assembly, machinery, equipment, or
other personal property. This definition of “subcontract” is much
broader than under the Vinson-Trammell Act, in that profits on the
production and sale of articles required for the performance of an
other contract or subcontract are subject to renegotiation, as well as
profits on the production or sale of all materials incorporated into
the end product, down to and including raw materials, except in the
case of certain specified raw materials exempted under subsection (i)
(1) (ii) of the statute. This definition is interpreted to include con
tracts with contractors and subcontractors (a) for the sale of an end
product or an article incorporated therein, (b) for the sale of ma
chinery or equipment used in the processing of an end product or of
an article incorporated in an end product, (c) for the sale of com
ponent parts of or subassemblies for such machinery or equipment,
and (d) for the performance of personal services required for the per
formance of the contracts and subcontracts included in (a), (b) and (c).
An allocation is made of sales of such machinery and equipment
based on the nature of the use thereof (i. e., war or commercial pro
duction) and to the extent to which the production of the purchasers
to whom such sales are made is subject to renegotiation, such sales
are considered renegotiable. Thus if 60 percent of the sales of the
purchasers to whom such machinery and equipment are sold is renegotiable, such sales of machinery and equipment are considered
renegotiable to the same extent. In those cases where it is unduly
burdensome or impractical to trace the end use of individual items
of machinery or equipment, the Departments frequently make this
determination on the basis of industry-wide estimates or by some
other method mutually agreed upon.
The term “article” has also been interpreted to include commer
cial products as well as equipment fabricated for particular uses or
purposes. The fact that commercial products are sold for industrial
uses, either directly or through jobbers or other commercial channels,
does not exclude such articles from this definition. The same tests
are applied to both ordinary commercial products and equipment
fabricated for special uses and purposes.
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The fact that all or part of such articles are sold under price ceil
ings fixed by the Office of Price Administration does not exclude such
articles from this definition, or exempt profits made on the sale
thereof from renegotiation.
J-PAB-2 (a)
2. Exemptions.—2 (a) Payment before April 28, 1942.—Contracts
and subcontracts are not subject to renegotiation under the statute
if final payment pursuant to such contract or subcontract was made
prior to April 28, 1942. If final payment on a contract or subcontract
was not made prior to April 28, 1942, profits made thereunder at any
time, even in years prior to 1942, are subject to renegotiation. The
Departments have adopted the policy that this provision with respect
to payment before April 28, 1942 will be interpreted so that payment
will be deemed to have been made although certain relatively small
unliquidated items may not have been finally determined and paid
for.
This exemption raises the legal question of when a series of trans
actions constitute one contract or several contracts. If the transac
tions constitute one contract and final payment had not been made
before April 28, 1942, then all the transactions thereunder are subject
to renegotiation. If, however, the transactions constitute several con
tracts, then only those contracts on which final payment had been
made before April 28, 1942, are exempt. This question arises fre
quently in cases involving reorders and orders under option agree
ments, periodic deliveries under purchase orders, and other similar
circumstances. In determining whether an order for further quan
tities or work constitutes a new and separate contract, the test is
whether a new or additional promise is given by the contractor with
respect to the additional order, or whether this additional quantity
or work is covered by an option, or otherwise, under the initial
contract.

J-PAB-2 (b) (i)
2. (b) (i) Fixed exemptions: Contracts with other governmental
agencies; Defense Plant Corporation.—Subsection (i) (1) (i) of the
statute provides that the statute shall not apply to any contract by a
Department with any other department, bureau, agency or govern
mental corporation of the United States or with any Territory, pos
session, or State or any agency thereof or with any foreign government
or any agency thereof. Contracts between such agencies or govern
mental corporations and private contractors, and subcontracts there
under, are likewise not subject to renegotiation, except in those in
stances where the agency or governmental corporation is acting as a
15

direct agent for a Department. In these instances, the contract is
deemed to be with the principal for whom the agency or govern
mental corporation is acting as direct agent, and not with the agency
or governmental corporation, and accordingly, if otherwise subject
to renegotiation, will not be exempted. Thus, contracts with Defense
Supplies Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Rubber Reserve
Company, and similar governmental corporations are not subject to
renegotiation unless it appears that the governmental corporation
was acting as the direct agent for one of the Departments.
As to contracts with the Defense Plant Corporation, the following
statement of policy has been approved by the Under Secretary of
War and the Under Secretary of the Navy:

With respect to contracts placed by Defense Plant Corporation
for machine tools and other equipment and personal property to
be included in leased facilities to prime contractors with or sub
contractors of the War and the Navy Departments, the War and
the Navy Departments will obtain appropriate information as to
sales, costs, and profits on such contracts and will include such con
tracts in the renegotiation wherever possible. If the contractors
object to such renegotiation and the information indicates the pos
sibility of excessive profits, the information will be transmitted to
Defense Plant Corporation which will examine the information
with a view to renegotiation in consultation with the War or Navy
Departments. Contracts placed by Defense Plant Corporation for
the construction of plants, as distinguished from the furnishing of
equipment and supplies, will not be renegotiated nor will contrac
tors be required to furnish information as to their profits on those
contracts.

It frequently happens that manufacturers of machine tools and other
equipment and personal property for Defense Plant Corporation
prefer to obtain a clearance from any possible statutory liability for
excessive profits on those contracts instead of relying solely on the
view of the Department that such contracts are not subject to rene
gotiation, and this procedure enables them to do so. The Depart
ments and Defense Plant Corporation also prefer to have such con
tracts included in the renegotiation whenever possible because in
many instances the Department agrees to indemnify the Defense
Plant Corporation against loss threon.

J-PAB-2 (b) (ii)
2 (b) (ii) Fixed exemptions: Contracts for certain raw materials —
Subsection (i) (1) (ii) provides that the statute shall not apply to any
contract or subcontract for the product of a mine, oil or gas well,
or other mineral or natural deposit, or timber, which has not been
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processed, refined, or treated beyond the first form or state suitable
for industrial use; and the Secretaries are authorized by joint regula
tion to define, interpret, and apply this exemption. Such joint regula
tion, promulgated as of February 1, 1943, is as follows:
“1. The term ‘exempted product,’ as used in this regulation,
shall mean any of the following products:
Aggregates consisting of washed or screened sand, gravel or
crushed stone.
Aluminum ingots and pigs; alumina; calcined or dried
bauxite; crude bauxite.
Antimony ore, crude; antimony ore, concentrated; antimony
metal; antimony oxide.
Arsenic powder; arsenious oxide (white arsenic).
Asbestos fibre.
Bismuth.
Cement.
Chromium ore and ferrochrome not processed beyond the
form or state suitable for use as an alloy or refractory in the
manufacture of steel; bichromates; chromic acid.
China clay; kaolin clay; fire clay; brick and tile made from
clays other than kaolin, china or fire clay.
Coal, prepared; run-of-mine coal.
Copper ore, crude; copper ore, concentrated; copper billets,
cathodes, cakes, ingots, ingot bars, powder, slabs, and wirebars.
Fluorspar ore; fluorspar fluxing gravel; lump ceramic ground
fluorspar; acid grades of fluorspar.
Crude iron ore; pig iron.
Gas, natural, not processed or treated further than the process
ing or treating customarily occurring at or near the well.
Gypsum, crude; calcined gypsum.
Lead ore; refined lead bars, ingots and pigs; antimonial lead
bars, ingots and pigs.
Lime.
Magnesite; dead burned magnesite.
Metallic magnesium, pigs and ingots.
Manganese ore; ferromanganese; silicomanganese.
Oil, crude, not processed or treated further than the process
ing or treating customarily occurring at or near the well.
Phosphate rock; superphosphate.
Ferromolybdenum; calcium molybdate; molybdenum oxide.
Rock salt; common salt of all grades.
Refined silver bars, shot, powder and grains.
Stone, rough dimension.
Sulphur, crude.
Standing timber, logs, logs sawed into lengths, and logs with
or without bark.
Refined pig tin.
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Tungsten ore and concentrates; ferrotungsten; tungsten
powder.
Vanadium ore and concentrates; ferrovanadium; vanadium
pentoxide.
Zinc anodes, balls, oxides, powder and slabs.
“2. Subsection (i) (1) (ii) of section 403 of the Sixth Supple
mental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, as amended, is
interpreted to mean that each of the exempted products is ‘the
product of a mine, oil or gas well, or other mineral or natural
deposit, or timber, which has not been processed, refined or treated
beyond the first form or state suitable for industrial use’. The
provisions of said section 403, as amended, shall not apply to con
tracts or subcontracts for the exempted products.
“3. In cases where a contractor or subcontractor (a) processes,
refines, or treats a product to bring it up to the form or state of an
exempted product and, (b) further refines, processes or treats such
exempted product beyond the first form or state suitable for indus
trial use in order to perform his contract or subcontract, then in
such cases the exempted product in its first form or state suitable
for industrial use shall be considered, for the purposes of renegotia
tion under section 403, as amended, as an item of cost at its
established sale or market price.
“4. This regulation may be amended from time to time, revis
ing the list of exempted products contained in paragraph 1 of this
regulation.”
J-PAB-2 (c)

2 (c) Discretionary exemptions— Under subsection (b) of the
statute, the Secretary, if in his opinion the provisions of the contract
or subcontract are otherwise adequate to prevent excessive profits,
may provide that renegotiation shall apply only to a portion of a
contract or subcontract, or shall not apply to performance during a
specified period or periods, and may also provide that the contract
price in effect during any such period or periods shall not be subject
to renegotiation. Under subsection (i) (2) of the Statute, the Secre
tary is authorized, in his discretion, to exempt from some or all of
the provisions of the statute, both individually and by general classes
or types: (i) any contract or subcontract to be performed outside
of the territorial limits of the continental United States or in Alaska;
(ii) any contracts or subcontracts under which, in the opinion of
the Secretary, the profits can be determined with reasonable cer
tainty when the contract price is established, such as certain classes of
agreements for personal services, for the purchase of real property,
perishable goods, or commodities the minimum price for the sale of
which has been fixed by a public regulatory body, of leases and
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license agreements, and of agreements where the period of per
formance under such contract or subcontract will not be in excess of
30 days; and (iii) a portion of any contract or subcontract or per
formance thereunder during a specified period or periods, if in the
opinion of the Secretary, the provisions of the contract are otherwise
adequate to prevent excessive profits. Such contracts and subcon
tracts remain subject to renegotiation until specifically exempted as
provided in the statute.
(i) The Secretary of War has delegated to the Chiefs of the Supply
Services including the Materiel Command, Army Air Forces, respec
tively, and the Secretary of the Navy has delegated to the Under
Secretary of the Navy, authority, in their discretion, to exempt, pur
suant to subsection (i) (1) (ii), any contract or subcontract to be per
formed outside of the territorial limits of the United States or in
Alaska from some or all of the provisions of the statute. This
authority may be exercised with respect to existing contracts and
with respect to contracts executed in the future.
Like authority has been delegated to the Director of Procurement
by the Secretary of the Treasury.
No contract or subcontract to be performed outside of the terri
torial limits of the United States or in Alaska will be exempt except
upon specific exemption individually or as a class by one of the
Chiefs of the Supply Services, or the Commanding General, Materiel
Command, Army Air Forces, of the War Department, the Under
Secretary of the Navy or the Director of Procurement in the Treasury
Department.
(ii) The Departments deem it impractical to issue jointly any
regulations establishing exemptions of classes of contracts or sub
contracts referred to in subsection (i) (2) of the statute because of
variations, as between the Departments, in the circumstances under
which those contracts and subcontracts are entered into. Pursuant
to that subsection, exemptions may, however, from time to time
hereafter be established by the respective Departments, applicable
only to contracts with such Department and subcontracts thereunder.
Such an exemption will not extend to contracts with any other
Department or subcontracts thereunder, of the same class, unless
specifically concurred in by the Secretary of such other Department.

J-PAB-2 (d)
2 (d) Subcontracts under exempt contracts.—The Departments in
terpret subsections (i) (1) (i) and (i) (1) (ii) of the statute to mean
that subcontracts under a contract or subcontract exempted by those
subsections, are likewise exempt. This, however, does not apply to
subcontracts under a contract or subcontract exempted by discre
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tionary action of one of the Secretaries pursuant to subsection (i) (2)
of the statute.
J-PAB-2 (e)
2 (e) Annual sales under $100,000.—While the statute provides
that the renegotiation clause need be included only in contracts
and subcontracts for amounts in excess of $100,000, nevertheless con
tracts and subcontracts for amounts of $100,000 or less are subject to
renegotiation unless otherwise exempted. The statute, however, is not
applicable unless the aggregate sales by the contractor or subcontrac
tor, and by all persons under the control of or controlling or under
common control with the contractor or subcontactor, under contracts
with the Departments and subcontracts thereunder do not exceed, or
in the opinion of the Secretary concerned will not exceed, $100,000
for the fiscal year of such contractor or subcontractor.
J-PAB-3

3. Subcontracts for real property excluded.—The term “article” is de
fined to include any “material * * * or other personal property.”
This definition, by inference at least, excludes real property. It fol
lows, therefore, that a sale of real property or the construction of
improvements thereon or of equipment to become a part thereof
which is required to perform another contract is not included in the
definition of the term “subcontract.” This situation must be care
fully distinguished from the case where the sale of the real property
or the construction of improvements thereon or equipment therefor
is the subject matter of a prime contract with one of the Departments.
Thus, a contract to sell, construct or equip a building for a contractor
requiring it in order to perform a contract or a subcontract would be
excluded; while a contract to sell, construct or equip a building
directly for a Department (or for one acting as an agent for a Depart
ment) would constitute a prime contract which would be subject to
renegotiation.
J-PAB-4
4. Statutes of limitation.—The statute provides two statutes of limita
tion, one on the renegotiation of individual contracts and the other
on renegotiation for an expired fiscal year or years.
(a) Renegotiation of individual contracts—No renegotiation of
the contract price pursuant to any provision therefor, or otherwise,
shall be commenced by the Secretary more than one year after the
close of the fiscal year of the contractor or subcontractor within which
completion or termination of the contract or subcontract, as deter
mined by the Secretary, occurs. (See subsection (c) (6).) The Depart
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ments interpret this provision to mean that renegotiation commences
on the specific date set by the Department conducting renegotiation
for the initial renegotiation conference unless otherwise agreed by
the contractor.
The question has arisen as to whether the term “completion * * *
of the contract,’’ as used in this provision, means final delivery,
acceptance or payment. The Departments have adopted the view
that completion of the contract means final delivery or acceptance
under the contract, rather than final payment, and the fact that a
contractor may still have certain obligations under guarantees of
performance or the fact that there may be unliquidated items out
standing does not extend the time of completion beyond the date of
final delivery or acceptance.
(b) Renegotiation for prior years.—Any contractor or subcon
tractor may file with the Secretaries of the Departments concerned
financial statements for any prior fiscal year or years, in such form and
detail as the Secretaries shall prescribe by joint regulation. The
Secretary of each such Department has one year thereafter within
which he may give written notice of renegotiation, in form and
manner to be prescribed in such joint regulation, fixing a date and
place for an initial conference to be held within 60 days, and unless
such notice is given by one of the Secretaries and renegotiation com
menced by such Secretary within 60 days, the liability of the con
tractor or subcontractor for excessive profits realized during such
year or years will be discharged. (See subsection (c) (5).)
A joint regulation prescribing the form of the financial statements
which the contractor or subcontractor may file was promulgated as
of February 1, 1943.

J-PAB-5
5. Recognition of exclusions and deductions allowed for Federal tax
purposes.—Under subsection (c) (3) of the statute, as amended, the
Secretary in determining the excessiveness of profits must “recognize
the properly applicable exclusions and deductions of the character’’
which the contractor or subcontractor is allowed under chapter 1
and chapter 2 E of the Internal Revenue Code. Since those items
must be properly applicable to the profits from the contracts and
subcontracts being renegotiated, they must be allocated between
the renegotiable and nonrenegotiable business, even though the full
amount is allowed for tax purposes. The words “of the character’’
disclaim the implication that the renegotiating authorities are re
quired to compute and allow the actual dollar amount of exclusions
and deductions which the Bureau of Internal Revenue would allow.
The Departments have issued the following interpretations with
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respect to the recognition of exclusions and deductions allowed for
Federal tax purposes:

J-PAB-5 (a)
5 (a) Amortization, depreciation and conversion.—Under section
124 of the Internal Revenue Code, if a contractor has acquired or
constructed with his own funds facilities especially adapted for use
in war production, he may amortize the cost over a 5-year period
at the rate of 20 percent per year upon obtaining a Certificate of
Necessity from the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy.
Even though the contactor has obtained a Certificate of Necessity, he
need not amortize the cost at this special rate but may, if he desires,
amortize his cost at ordinary rates.
In computing net profits before Federal income and excess profits
taxes of any contractor or subcontractor, for purposes of renegotia
tion, the amount of amortization allowed under section 124 of the
Internal Revenue Code (except to the extent of depreciation) will
not be allowed as an item of cost. However, the amount of such
amortization in excess of depreciation will be deducted from such
profits and not considered as representing excessive profits for pur
poses of renegotiation. In determining whether and the extent to
which profits remaining after deducting the amount of such amortiza
tion are excessive, consideration will be given to the extent that it
appears that the contractor or subcontractor will have residual value
in the amortized facilities so far as it may be reasonably ascertained.
If the emergency is terminated during the 5-year period, the
amortization period may be shortened accordingly, and the con
tractor or subcontractor will be entitled to adjust his taxes for prior
years, on the conditions stated in the Internal Revenue Code, to give
effect to the corresponding increase in the deduction taken in each
such year, but there is no authority for reopening renegotiation
agreements to give consideration to this accelerated amortization
corresponding to the adjustment of taxes for prior years to which
the contractor or subcontractor may thus become entitled.
War facilities not covered by Certificates of Necessity, representing
permanent capital additions for the manufacture of war products
or materials, are depreciated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and
will be depreciated in renegotiation, at the ordinary rates of deprecia
tion for corresponding property. The demands of war production,
however, frequently require the use of facilities for extraordinary
consecutive periods of day and night shifts, and under those circum
stances the Bureau and the renegotiation authorities may allow
depreciation on the machinery, but not on the buildings, at higher
rates.
22

The full amount of costs of converting facilities to war production
which do not represent permanent additions, such as rearrangement
of machinery, is allowed by the Bureau, and will be allowed in re
negotiation, for the year in which it is incurred. This does not in
clude losses on commercial inventory which has become unsaleable
as a result of wartime regulations or loss of market.

J-PAB-5 (b)
5 (b) Losses from prior years—Section 122 of the Internal
Revenue Code authorizes the deduction for any taxable year of the
“net operating loss” for the first and second preceding taxable years,
subject to certain exceptions and limitations. The part of such loss
which was attributable to contracts or subcontracts subject to
renegotiation is a “properly applicable” deduction which is allowed
in renegotiation, but the part which was attributable to commercial
business or to contracts and subcontracts not subject to renegotiation
is not allowed. The term “net operating loss” and the amount
thereof which is deductible for tax purposes is defined in the code.
In determining the amount of “net operating loss” to be allowed for
renegotiation purposes, losses on contracts and subcontracts pursuant
to which final payment was made prior to April 28, 1942, or which
for other reasons would not be subject to renegotiation even had
such losses been incurred during the fiscal year or other period under
consideration, are not allowed.
Even though a contractor has no “net operating loss” to carry over
for tax purposes, the renegotiating authorities, nevertheless, give
consideration, under proper circumstances, to losses incurred in prior
years on contracts and subcontracts subject to renegotiation. This
does not necessarily mean that the full amount of such losses are to
be allowed against profits for the fiscal year or other period under
consideration, but only that they may be recognized as one of the
factors in determining whether such profits are excessive.
The Internal Revenue Code also provides for the “carry back” of
“net operating losses” in subsequent years through adjustment of
taxes for prior years, but there is no authority for reopening re
negotiation agreements to give consideration to net losses incurred
in periods subsequent to the periods covered by such agreements.
J-PAB-5 (c)
5 (c) War losses.—Section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code pro
vides that the amount of the loss on account of property destroyed or
seized on or after December 7, 1941, in the course of military or naval
operations by the United States or any other country engaged in
the present war may be allowed as a deduction from income in the
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year in which such destruction or seizure occurs. The fact that the
property has been destroyed or seized in the course of the war does
not of itself establish the loss as a “properly applicable” deduction
to be recognized in renegotiation. In order that such a loss be
recognized in renegotiation, the contractor or subcontractor must
furnish evidence satisfactory to the renegotiating authorities of the
connection between the property destroyed or seized and the per
formance of the contracts or subcontracts being renegotiated.

J-PAB-5 (d)
5 (d) Interest.—Interest on borrowed capital is deductible under
the Internal Revenue Code and is, therefore, allowed where properly
applicable for purposes of contract renegotiation.
The general principle used in the allocation of interest is that all
interest on borrowed funds is allocated between sales subject to
renegotiation and sales not subject to renegotiation on the basis of
the proportion which each category of sales bears to the total busi
ness, with the exception that in no case is the interest charged to
sales subject to renegotiation less than the interest on those borrow
ings which can be definitely ascertained as applicable to such sales
(e. g., “V” loans, advance payments, etc.), and similarly, in no case is
interest charged to sales not subject to renegotiation less than the
interest on those borrowings which can be definitely ascertained as
applicable to such sales. An appropriate portion of such interest will
be allocated to income, if any, derived from sources other than sales.
So long as the borrowed capital is used for war purposes, it does
not matter when the obligation was incurred. Interest on long-term
bonds and obligations issued long before the war is allowable if the
capital represented by such obligations is used for war production.
J-PAB-5 (e)
5 (e) Advertising.—Allowances for advertising expenses are based
upon deductions allowed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for tax
purposes. These allowable deductions have been described by Com
missioner Guy T. Helvering of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in a
statement issued on September 29, 1942, as follows:

To be deductible, advertising expenditures must be ordinary and
necessary and bear a reasonable relation to the business activities
in which the enterprise is engaged. The Bureau recognizes that
advertising is a necessary and legitimate business expense so long
as it is not carried to an unreasonable extent or does not become
an attempt to avoid proper tax payments.
The Bureau realizes that it may be necessary for taxpayers now
engaged in war production to maintain through advertising, their
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trade names and the knowledge of the quality of their products
and good will built up over past years, so that when they return to
peacetime production their names and the quality of their prod
ucts will be known to the public.
In determining whether such expenditures are allowable, cog
nizance will be taken of (1) the size of the business, (2) the amount
of prior advertising budgets, (3) the public patronage reasonably
to be expected in the future, (4) the increased cost of the elements
entering into the total of advertising expenditures, (5) the intro
duction of new products and added lines, and (6) buying habits
necessitated by war restrictions, by priorities, and by the unavail
ability of many of the raw materials formerly fabricated into the
advertised products.
Reasonable expenses incurred by companies in advertising and
advertising technique to speed the war effort among their own em
ployees, and to cut down accidents and unnecessary absences
and inefficiency, will be allowed as deductions. Also reasonable
expenditures for advertisements including the promotion of Gov
ernment objectives in wartime, such as conservation, salvage or the
sale of War Bonds, which are signed by the advertiser, will be
deductible provided they are reasonable and are not made in an
attempt to avoid proper taxation.
Ordinarily, product advertising specifically offering individual
products for current sale (as distinguished from institutional adver
tising designed to keep the advertiser’s name or the names of its
peacetime products before the public) is charged in full to com
mercial business, but product advertising by subcontractors may be
allowed in a reasonable amount as a charge against renegotiable
business with respect to products sold primarily for use in war pro
duction.
The test of whether expenditures for advertising are reasonable is
whether they are ordinary and necessary and bear a reasonable rela
tion to the business activities in which the enterprise is engaged. In
making this test of reasonableness, consideration is given to the
amount spent for institutional advertising, and for product advertis
ing of the nature of institutional advertising. If such expenditures
are extravagant and out of proportion to the size of the company
or to the amount of its advertising budget in the past, such payments
will be disallowed as elements of cost.

J-PAB-5 (f)
5 (f) Salaries, wages, and other compensation.—Subsection (d) of
section 403 provides that “in renegotiating a contract price or de
termining excessive profits * * * the Secretaries of the respective De
partments shall not make any allowance for any salaries, bonuses
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or other compensation paid by a contractor to its officers or em
ployees in excess of a reasonable amount.” Pursuant to such provi
sion consideration is given to the nature of the work, extent of
responsibility and experience and effectiveness of the officer or
employee, and increases in compensation since January 1, 1939; and
comparison is made where possible with the compensation of officers
or employees in similar positions in other companies within the
particular industry. Reasonableness of compensation is determined
only within broad limits, and weight is given to the determination
by the company of the value to it of the services of an officer or
employee.
Any statutory provision, and any Executive orders or regulations
and salaries issued under the Act of Congress approved October 2,
1942, regulating or limiting the payment of wages and salaries will
be observed in renegotiation so far as applicable.
J-PAB-6

6. Costs of post-war conversion.—Contractors frequently create re
serves for the purpose of reconverting their plant facilities to normal
peacetime operations at the termination of the war. It is the policy
of the Departments to disallow any such charges for the reasons that
(i) the necessity for the reconversion may never arise; (ii) the nature,
extent and cost of reconversion is too conjectural to warrant a
present determination with respect thereto; and (iii) the unknown
duration of the war precludes an estimate with any degree of accuracy
of the amount of money which may be required for reconversion.
This is in accordance with the policy stated by Mr. Donald M. Nel
son, Chairman of the War Production Board, in a letter dated
March 6, 1942, addressed to the Under Secretaries of the War and
Navy Departments.
J-PAB-7
7. Patent royalties.—Public Law 768, 77th Congress, approved Octo
ber 31, 1942, provides that whenever an invention, patented or un
patented, is manufactured for the United States, with license from
the owner, and such license provides for the payment of royalties
at rates or amounts ‘‘believed to be unreasonable or excessive by the
head of the department or agency of the Government which has
ordered such manufacture”, the head of the Department concerned
shall notify the licensor and the licensee and within a reasonable
time thereafter shall ‘‘fix and specify such rates or amounts of
royalties, if any, as he shall determine are fair and just, taking into
account the conditions of wartime production” and shall authorize
the payment thereof by the licensee to the licensor. It further pro
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vides that the licensee shall not thereafter pay to the licensor nor
charge to the United States a royalty in excess of that specified in
the order and that the licensor’s sole and exclusive remedy for royal
ties in excess thereof shall be by suit in the Court of Claims or in the
district courts having concurrent jurisdiction. The statute further
provides that:
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to preclude the ap
plicability of Public Law 528, 77th Congress [i.e., section 403],
as the same may be heretofore or hereafter amended so far as the
same may be applicable.
As part of the renegotiation with any contractor or subcontractor
who has included in costs substantial amounts for royalties paid or
payable under patent licenses, inquiry will be made as to any action
taken, pending or contemplated under the statute, and no allowance
will be made for royalties in excess of any rate or amount fixed and
specified by the head of the department or agency of the Govern
ment which has ordered manufacture thereunder.
In the absence of an order under the royalty statute, the renego
tiation authorities will consider whether or not the amount of the
royalties is fair and reasonable under the circumstances (taking into
consideration the affiliation, if any, of the licensor and licensee).
J-PAB-8

8. Contracts with manufacturers’ representatives.—Contracts between
manufacturers and their representatives are subject to renegotiation
as subcontracts when the representative is performing, or agrees to
make available on request, engineering, mechanical, or other services
related to the performance of one or more prime contracts with one
of the Departments or subcontracts thereunder, including assistance
in the obtaining of priority certificates and in other matters required
in connection with performance of the contract. For example, manu
facturers’ agents in the machine tool industry customarily hold them
selves ready to furnish engineering advice, mechanical service, and
advice on training in the use of tools irrespective of whether they
are availed of by the manufacturer, and by contract or custom the
commissions of the agent are usually paid in either case and charged
by the manufacturer into the cost of the tool. These activities com
prise “part of the work required for the performance of another
contract” within the definition of subcontact in the renegotiation
statute. When a manufacturer’s representative also acts as dealer
he is in substantially the same position as a jobber and his sales of
articles to one of the Departments or a contractor with a Depart
ment or a subcontractor thereunder are subject to renegotiation
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whether the articles are delivered from his own inventory or shipped
direct by the manufacturer. The fact that the prices on articles
handled by manufacturers’ representatives and jobbers are regu
lated under Office of Price Administration price ceilings does not
affect the result. The reasonableness of such charges determines the
extent to which they will be allowed as costs of the contractor for
the purpose of renegotiation.
J-PAB-9

9. Over-all renegotiation; Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.—Renegotiation
on the basis of the over-all profit on the war contracts of a contractor
or subcontractor for a specified period was not expressly authorized
by the original statute and was adopted by the Departments as a
matter of policy. This method is now authorized by the statute, as
amended, which expressly provides for renegotiation of contracts
and subcontracts as a group without separately renegotiating the
contract price of each contract or subcontract. The statute also con
tains, however, the original provision for renegotiation by individual
contracts, and in some instances the Secretaries have found that
method more convenient in actual practice. Under renegotiation on
an over-all basis, excessive profits are determined by a study of a
contractor’s financial position and the profits, past and prospective,
from his contracts and subcontracts taken as a whole for a particular
fiscal year or other period rather than by analyzing each individual
contract or subcontract on a unit cost basis.
Only contracts with the Departments named in the statute and
subcontracts thereunder are subject to renegotiation and accord
ingly sales and costs are segregated between them and other contracts
and business. War contracts not subject to renegotiation ordinarily
will be renegotiated if the contractor or subcontractor so requests,
provided their inclusion does not reduce the profits on the renegoti
able business, but under no circumstances will commercial or civilian
business be included in the renegotiation.
In renegotiation on an over-all profit basis, fees under cost-plusfixed-fee contracts will be renegotiated separately from the fixed-price
contracts of the contractor.
J-PAB-10

10. Credit for Federal taxes; State and local taxes.—Before the amend
ment to the statute, concern had been frequently expressed that a
contractor might be required to pay taxes on his profits and then be
required at a later date to refund these profits as a result of renego
tiation. The statute originally made no express provision for crediting
against excessive profits eliminated through renegotiation Federal
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income and excess profits taxes assessed with respect thereto. In the
absence of such credit the contractor would be forced to pay twice,
once in the form of taxes and the second time by a refund of
excessive profits. While it seemed plain that the original statute did
not intend such double liability, section 403 was amended to provide
that in determining the amount of excessive profits the Secretary
shall allow the contractor or subcontractor credit for the amount of
the Federal income and excess profits taxes paid or payable with
respect to such excessive profits, as provided in section 3806 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
Under section 3806 of the code, in case of renegotiation with re
spect to years for which Federal income and excess profits returns
have not been filed, the amount of excessive profits eliminated may
be excluded from gross income in such returns, provided at the time
of filing the return the renegotiation has progressed to such a stage
that the amount of excessive profits eliminated has become certain.
This procedure has been specifically authorized by I. T. 3577 (In
ternational Revenue Bulletin 1942 No. 37), and is subject to the con
dition that a tax may be assessed on any portion of the excessive
profits which is not eliminated by renegotiation.
State and local taxes are recognized as a proper item of expense,
subject, of course, to allocation between renegotiable and nonre
negotiable business.
J-PAB-11

11. Final agreements and clearance.—When a contractor or subcon
tractor has renegotiated in good faith for a specified period and
agreed to eliminate excessive profits for such period, he is entitled
to assurance that the matter will not be reopened at a later date.
The original statute did not expressly provide for any final clearance
from liability for excessive profits, but under the statute as amended,
the Secretaries are expressly authorized to make agreements and “any
such agreement shall be final and conclusive according to its terms;
and, except upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance or a wilful mis
representation of a material fact, such agreement shall not be
reopened as to the matter agreed upon, and shall not be modified by
any officer, employee, or agent of the United States.” The Secretary
of each Department has delegated to the Secretary of each other
Department the power to sign final and other agreements on his
behalf, with respect to renegotiations assigned to such other Depart
ment. Thus, if a case for renegotiation is assigned to the Secretary
of one Department for renegotiation, the Secretary of that Depart
ment has the power to sign a final agreement on behalf of the Secre
taries of the other Departments.
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J-PAB-12
12. Responsibility of contractors to withhold payments of excessive
profits to subcontractors.—Under the terms of the statute, as originally
adopted, concern was expressed by many contractors in regard to
their liability to withhold excessive profits made by their subcon
tractors. Under the statute as amended, the contractor is under no
obligation to withhold payments to a subcontractor unless there
has been a determination by the Government of the existence of
excessive profits. In other words, the contractor should make pay
ment to the subcontractor in accordance with the terms of the sub
contract until such time as a determination of excessive profits under
the subcontract has been made and the contractor has been directed
to withhold payments to the subcontractor. If at such time there are
further payments due, the contractor should retain the amount
specified in such direction. If all payments have been made to the
subcontractor prior to the time when the contractor receives notice
of a direction for withholding such excessive profits, the contractor
has no responsibility or obligation in the matter of withholding pay
ments under such subcontract. Conversely, a subcontractor is liable
to the Government only for the repayment of amounts representative
of excessive profits actually paid to him by a contractor and not for
those eliminated through reductions in contract prices or otherwise.
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